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Introduction
It is argued that neuroscience will eventually revolutionize the law (Wegner, 2002; Greene and
Cohen, 2004; O’Hara, 2004; Churchland, 2011). Virtually all legal systems are grounded on the
assumption that human beings (can) act on the basis of their own free will; voluntary actions
are driven by people’s intentions, and individuals are therefore responsible (and punishable) for
their own actions. Neuroscience seems to challenge this assumption at two different levels: at
the theoretical or anthropological level by proposing a new model of human being, and at the
empirical level by attempting to provide scientific evidence that free will is nothing more than an
illusion (Sellars, 1963; Frith, 2007; Churchland, 2011). In the following, we will argue (i) that the
anthropological challenge to free will is not specific to neuroscience and (ii) that by focusing on
an oversimplified operationalization of free will, current empirical research has only limited impact
upon the law. In order to be applicable within the legal system, cognitive neuroscience should rather
consider how free will—or the different modes of free will—is conceptualized in the legal system,
and incorporate these concepts into more appropriate experimental designs.
The Anthropological Challenge: Neuroscience and the New
Human Being
By explaining voluntary behavior in terms of biological and chemical processes occurring in the
brain, neuroscience seems to leave little to no room for free will. This is relevant for the law because
if there is no free will, does it make sense to punish people for their crimes? This argument is fuelled
by the philosophical position of determinism, which states that every state is entirely determined
by preceding physical states that are beyond human control. In a nutshell, the logic goes as follows:
since behavior, including our voluntary choices, is generated by a biological machine—i.e., the
brain—it necessarily follows the deterministic laws of the physical world. Human behavior is
therefore determined in advance by previous states of the world that escape our conscious control.
Free will is nothing more than an illusion and individuals should not be held responsible for their
actions, not even for the crimes they commit.
Neuroscience is therefore supposed to change the law by offering a different model of human
being: according to the law, the human mind is generated by the brain but does not correspond
to the brain and preserves some degree of autonomy; conversely, neuroscience’s ultimate goal
is to explain the totality of behavior in terms of neural processes (Lavazza and Sammicheli,
2012). From this perspective, although we have the illusion of being in control, all our actions—
including crimes—are in fact committed by neural processes that we cannot control (e.g.,
Wegner, 2002). One should note that this anti-free will position seems very convincing. Indeed,
a brain-centered vision of the human being has been found to affect the folk psychology of free
Rigoni et al. Volition and the law
will: when crimes are described as the result of neural processes
occurring in the brain, the attribution of free will and moral
responsibility to an hypothetical criminal is reduced (Nahmias
et al., 2005, 2007), and people also tend to have less punishing
attitudes (Shariff et al., 2014). However, the idea that the
causal forces underlying behavior escape human control is not
restricted to neuroscience, but derives from the reduction of
neuroscience in the domain of hard sciences. For instance,
behavioral genetics assume that casual DNA variations determine
physical characteristics as well as behavioral tendencies (Asbury
and Plomin, 2013), including crime-related tendencies such as
violence and impulsivity (e.g., Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2006).
In a similar vein, at the end of the nineteenth century criminal
anthropologist Cesare Lombroso argued that “criminals do not
commit crimes out of their own free will, but they are urged
to commit crimes because of their innate and primitive organic
nature” (Lombroso, 1876, p. 29)1 . Therefore, the deterministic
argument that behavior is governed by factors that are not under
human control has been proposed in the past, and it is not
specific to neuroscience. In other words, this has nothing to do
with the empirical neuroscientific endeavor, but it requires the
philosophical endorsement of a specific model of human being.
The Empirical Challenge: Scientific
Evidence against Free Will?
Neuroscience is supposed to influence the law, not just by
proposing a different anthropological model of a human being,
but also by investigating, at the empirical level, the neural bases
of human volition. The first attempt to tackle scientifically the
problem of free will was conducted in the early ‘80s by Benjamin
Libet and his colleagues. In a series of experiments, participants
were instructed to perform self-paced voluntary flexions of
their index finger while their brain activity was measured
with the electroencephalogram (EEG; Libet et al., 1983). While
participants decided to press the key they watched a clock hand
rotating and were instructed to indicate the moment in time
when they formed the intention tomove the finger. By comparing
the reported moment of the conscious intention “to move the
finger now” with the EEG signal from motor areas responsible
for preparing and executing the movement, it was observed
that motor areas in the brain were activated around 1 s before
participants reported the intention to move: the brain “knew”
that the participant was going to move the finger well before the
participant knew himself. According to the authors, this result
provided the first empirical evidence that voluntary movements
are initiated unconsciously, thereby questioning the traditional
concept of free will. Despite some skepticism, the finding that our
conscious intentions are preceded by unconscious brain activity
in the motor areas of the brain has been replicated (Haggard
and Eimer, 1999; Rigoni et al., 2013). The intention “I want to
move my finger now” would not be the cause of the action, but
rather a perception of the current motor state that has already
been determined in the brain (Hallett, 2007). One limitation of
this type of study is that it only focuses on the when component
1Translated by the authors.
of the action; however, free will also concerns choices, that
is, what is the specific action we want to perform (Brass and
Haggard, 2008). In a few recent studies combining a free-choice
paradigm with functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI),
participants were asked to decide between a left and a right button
press that they should execute at a freely chosen time (e.g., Soon
et al., 2008). They were then asked to report the time at which the
decision was actually made. Results showed that the outcome of
the decision was encoded in the brain activity of the prefrontal
and parietal cortex up to 10 s before it entered awareness. So the
question arises: if we can predict 10 s before someone indicates
he is going to press a key which key that will be, then how can we
be considered responsible for our own actions?2
Toward a New Neuroscience of Human
Volition
While these data are often interpreted as the empirical proof of
the view that all the effective mechanisms that cause our actions
are unconscious (Wegner, 2002; Hallett, 2007), the key question
is whether such empirical evidence can be used by the law to
improve the determination of personal responsibility during a
trial. In order to be relevant to the law, it is crucial that the
type of intention that is investigated in cognitive neuroscience
is analogous to the type of intention that is relevant to the law.
But is the intention “to move the finger now” really paradigmatic
of the type of intention that is usually assessed by the Court?
How would neuroscience help to establish the culpability related
to a murder committed by a serial killer vs. the legitimacy of
a “murder” committed by an executioner of a person who is
sentenced to death?
In our view, current neuroscientific research on the neural
bases of human volition has a limited impact on the law
because it focuses on simplified concepts of intention and
intentionality. Throughout the centuries, legal systems have
developed very sophisticated conceptual categories that are
used in Court to determine whether a certain behavior is
criminally liable or not. While an exhaustive description of
the different categories of intentions and intentionality in the
different legal systems obviously is beyond the scope of the
present article, here we want to stress that, to be relevant to the
law, neuroscience should first endorse more sophisticated and
nuanced definitions of intention. In virtually all legal systems,
there are at least three categories, or modes, of intentions.
The first mode is condensed in the Latin concept of the
suitas, which refers to the extent to which a certain behavior
belongs psychologically to the actor in order to be punished.
In psychological terms, this means that to be punishable, a
behavior has to imply a certain degree of mental presence
of the actor. Conversely, an automatism (e.g., a movement
triggered by a Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) pulse
over the primary motor cortex, or a crime committed in a
2One important aspect of the study by Soon et al. (2008) is often ignored, namely
that the prediction accuracy is only 60%. This means that in 40% of the trials one
cannot predict the choice correctly. This of course leaves a lot of space for free will,
and therefore existing data do not exclude the possibility that conscious intentions
are sometimes causally effective.
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state of somnambulism) does not have any criminal relevance
because the behavior does not belong to the actor. In other
words, there is no crime if there is no suitas3. This mode of
intentionality therefore qualifies the difference between actions
as purely mechanical phenomena—e.g., raising a hand—and
actions as mental events—e.g., “I” raise my hand.While the suitas
requires the mere psychological presence of the actor during the
commission of the crime, the second mode of intentionality—
mens rea or culpability in Anglo-Saxon systems—refers to the
quality of that psychological presence, that is, the specific attitude
of the perpetrator: the act is culpable only if it is produced
by a guilty mind. Rather than being a dichotomous conceptual
category, different levels of culpability have been established
in all legal systems. For instance, in US criminal law, levels
of culpability range from negligent (i.e., the actor does not
consider the risk of his or her conduct) to purposeful (i.e., the
criminal act is driven by the intention to commit the crime).
A third mode of intention is that of the insanity defense: in
order to be punishable, a crime has to be produced by a
healthy and intact mind. It is crucial to note here the subtle
distinctive element of the category of the insanity defense as
compared to both the suitas and the mens rea. On the one
3Hence the definition “defense of automatism” in the Anglo-Saxon system.
hand, a crime committed by an insane mind, say during a
psychotic episode, cannot be considered an automatism—and
therefore there is suitas; on the other hand, the criminal act must
also be the result of a guilty mind—so there is also mens rea.
A patient diagnosed with schizophrenia who accidentally shoots
the neighbor would be excused by the court because there is no
crime; while the same patient who shoots the neighbor during
a psychotic episode would be judged not guilty by reason of
insanity.
Taken together, these considerations stress that in order
to change the law, neuroscientists should first refer to the
multifaceted conceptualizations of intentions (e.g., suitas, mens
rea, insanity) that have been developed within the law throughout
the centuries. More advanced theoretical models and new
experimental paradigms can be developed on the basis of such
categories, so that empirical data can directly feed the juridical
discussion about how well these categories describe the nature
of human volition. Without this bidirectional contribution, the
neuroscientific challenge to free will and personal responsibility
will have only limited consequences for the law. In order to
appraise the potential revolutionizing impact of neuroscience on
the law, it is therefore necessary to understand whether, and
how, the law can reframe the neuroscientific study of human
volition.
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